DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 346 056 SP 033 813

AUTHOR Theobald, Neil D.
TITLE How Do We Get from Here to There?: Allocating Resources To Renew Teacher Education.
PUB DATE Apr 92
NOTE 29p.; Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association (San Francisco, CA, April 20-24, 1992).
PUB TYPE Speeches/Conference Papers (150) -- Reports - Research/Technical (143)

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC02 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS Case Studies; Delivery Systems; *Economic Impact; *Educational Finance; *Educational Research; Faculty College Relationship; Higher Education; *Research Universities; *Resource Allocation; *Schools of Education; Teacher Education Programs
IDENTIFIERS Reform Efforts

ABSTRACT

This study describes the economics of teacher education in a public research university. It assumes that faculty members in such schools, colleges, and departments of education (SCDEs) attempt to maximize an objective function that depends positively on research productivity and student quality and negatively on class size. A case study approach is used to test the degree to which a school of education carries out profitable activities that society is willing to pay for (e.g., teacher education) in order to obtain resources for costly faculty-preferred activities that society will not fully finance directly (e.g., small graduate seminars). The primary finding of this study is that the teacher education programs subsidize other programs by approximately 10 percent. The latter part of the paper addresses the question of how teacher education reformers can reallocate resources in support of the new set of goals implicit in their reform agenda. A list of references and four tables complete the document. (Author)

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How Do We Get From Here to There?: Allocating Resources to Renew Teacher Education

Neil D. Theobald
University of Washington
College of Education
Seattle, WA 98195

Telephone: (206) 543-1836

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Prepared for Presentation at the Annual Conference of the
American Educational Research Association
San Francisco, California
April 23, 1992

SP033 813

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Abstract

Using an approach suggested by James (1990), the paper describes the economics of teacher education in a public research university. It assumes that faculty members in such schools, colleges, and departments of education attempt to maximize an objective function that depends positively on research productivity and student quality, and negatively on class size. The paper then uses a case-study approach to test the degree to which a school of education carries out profitable activities that society is willing to pay for (e.g., teacher education) in order to obtain resources for costly faculty-preferred activities that society will not fully finance directly (e.g., small graduate seminars). The primary finding of this study is that the teacher education program subsidizes other programs by approximately 10%. The latter part of the paper addresses the question of how teacher education reformers can reallocate resources in support of the new set of goals implicit in their reform agenda.

How Do We Get From Here to There?: Allocating Resources to Renew Teacher Education

> Our future as a nation depends more critically than ever before upon the quality of what and how we teach our children.
>
> Spring Hill Letter, 1987

The Spring Hill Letter, a statement endorsed by several hundred college and university presidents, asserts that our current educational enterprise represents "a national emergency" that threatens to undermine "all of the major dimensions of our national life--security, economic growth, human welfare, social stability, cultural achievement" (American Association for Higher Education, 1987, p. 10). In order to avert a crisis, the presidents argue, higher education must focus attention on its primary lever for improving schools--the enhancement and reform of educational programs for teachers.

Although the letter is careful to emphasize that teacher education is "a task in which *all our faculties* [italics in original] are deeply involved" (AAHE, 1987, p. 14), the presidents' message has obviously been of particular interest to faculties in schools, colleges, and departments of education (SCDEs). What are the implications of an institutional move to highlight the importance of teacher education? What expectations might such a move generate for faculty members involved in teacher education programs? Will current SCDE structures suffice for meeting these new demands? What effect might teacher education reform have on other programs of study within the SCDE?

This paper addresses such questions through the narrow lens of resource allocation. This approach is needed because even the best-

conceived teacher education reform effort is almost certain to founder unless the necessary resources are made available to support it. As an SCDE's priorities change, its faculty and administrators must review the resource-allocation decisions implicit in its budget to ensure that they reflect this new focus.

Unfortunately, discussions of troublesome resource issues in teacher education reform proposals are all too often confined to a few vague suggestions buried in a concluding chapter. For example, a major report championing professional development schools as a promising vehicle for renewing teacher education, limits its consideration of human-resource needs to a recommendation that, "The school of education can allocate portions of some faculty members' time to work in the Professional Development School" (Holmes Group, 1990, p. 90). As a recent paper on financing professional development schools points out:

> In the current academic ethos, it would require an act of considerable determination and courage for faculty members--especially those below the rank of full professor--to unilaterally commit themselves to the professionally demanding activities involved in [professional development] schools. Recent history suggests that theoretical work conducted on-campus, similar to research conducted in the arts and sciences, is a much more promising route to tenure and promotion. (Theobald, 1991, p. 94)

Ignoring the constraints college and university faculties face in allocating their most precious resource--time--does not make these concerns any less real. The failure of exploratory programs launched to date to confront such

issues has left education faculties and deans without much of the guidance they need in order to undertake the agenda proposed.

The Economics of Teacher Education within Research Universities

Budgets exist in order to efficiently harness available resources--such as faculty and staff time--toward the fulfillment of organizational objectives. The first step in making resource allocation decisions, therefore, is identifying and prioritizing the institution's goals. The resource allocation decisions outlined in this budget are intended to provide incentives for individual faculty members to pursue the stated or implied goals of the institution.

To date, little empirical work has been completed about the resource allocation process inside SCDEs. Instead, researchers have focused either on *intrainstitutional* comparisons (i.e., how well are SCDEs funded in comparison to other academic disciplines on the same campus?) (Berliner, 1984; Orr & Peseau, 1979) or *interinstitutional* comparisons of similar programs (i.e., how well is teacher education funded in comparison to other teacher education programs on peer campuses?) (Peseau, 1988; Peseau & Orr, 1980; Peseau & Tudor, 1989).

Such analysis is crucial in the long run for building a strong case to provide more institutional resources for SCDEs generally, and more specifically, for teacher education. In the short run, however, SCDE faculties and deans have limited influence over the allocation of resources among academic disciplines on campus. From their perspective, in the absence of significant external funding, the "size of the pie" is relatively fixed; their task is to divide these resources among teacher education and other programs within the SCDE.

This paper will therefore divert from previous approaches and focus on *intradepartmental* resource allocation (i.e., how well does the SCDE fund teacher education in comparison to its other programs?). It is at the intradepartmental level that SCDE faculties and deans currently allocate resources to pursue institutional goals. It is at this level that they will have the ability to reallocate resources to reflect any changes in these priorities.

Institutional Goals

Fenske (1980) defines institutional goals as declarations of purpose that fall between broad mission statements and specific descriptions of university operations. In the last 35 years, researchers have generally posited 'prestige maximization' as the major institutional goal of research universities (Ben-David, 1971; Brown, 1967; Caplow & McGee, 1958; Jencks & Reisman, 1968; Mayhew, 1970; Vladeck, 1976). Since most universities are non-profit organizations, they must spend all revenues within the institution, and all work-related satisfaction derived by university personnel (beyond their fixed salaries) must come from organizational, not personal, expenditures.

James (1990) argues that this organizational structure leads to a number of behavioral implications: (a) Faculty preferences matter in determining how programs are structured; (b) The assumption that cost-minimizing inputs are chosen to produce outputs does not apply; and (c) Cross-subsidization plays an important role. This view suggests that departments within a university carry out profitable activities that society is willing to pay for (e.g., undergraduate education) in order to obtain resources for costly faculty-preferred activities that society will not fully finance directly (e.g., research).

Such behavior is constrained by the need to generate sufficient revenue through the university budgeting process, donations, and grants to cover

departmental expenditures. Most universities tie their budgeting process in some way to the number of student credit hours generated. Therefore, an important part of the revenue decision that departments make is how many students to enroll. More students generate more revenue. However, as a department dips deeper into a relatively fixed pool of applicants, student selectivity is likely to decline.

The role of central university administrators is to determine the disciplinary product mix of the institution by allocating revenues among the university's major units. These departments are then free to exercise considerable latitude in terms of who to hire and promote, what individual faculty members teaching loads will be, what courses will be offered, and who will teach each course. Within research universities, these decisions are likely to be made with significant faculty involvement.

James (1978, 1986) asserts that a preference for time to conduct research and the desire to teach small, advanced classes heavily influences faculty contributions to this process. In addition, Garvin (1980) assumes that faculty members attempt to influence these decisions in an effort to maximize student quality. In the absence of a monetary profit in which it can share, the faculty maximizes its satisfaction by influencing the allocation of departmental resources towards on-the-job consumption of goods it prefers (e.g., high student quality, research time, low class size). This suggests the following objective function for a research university department:

$$\text{Departmental satisfaction} = f_1(\text{Departmental prestige, Faculty satisfaction})$$

$$= f_2(\text{Research productivity, Student quality, Class size})$$

Subject to the constraint that: Revenues are equal to expenditures.

Departments within a research university attempt to maximize an objective function that depends positively on research productivity and student quality, and negatively on class size, subject to a break-even constraint.

SCDE Goals

Do SCDEs pursue a similar objective function? Education faculty members are generally quite sensitive to their department's reputation and its position relative to other departments within the university. This can be explained, at least in part, by the complementary relationship that Breneman (1970) found to exist between the prestige of an individual faculty member (i.e., his or her reputation within the discipline) and the prestige of the department to which he or she is attached. Breneman argues that faculty members seek to increase their personal prestige because it increases their value in the academic labor market, permits faster promotions, and facilitates the procurement of research funding. In addition, SCDE administrators can most directly strengthen their programs by recruiting scholars of greater competence and reputation than are now present.

Efforts to increase an SCDE's prestige, then, seem to serve the self-interests of both SCDE administrators and faculty, although the former may be more concerned with the SCDE's status, while individual faculty members may be more concerned about the relative prestige of their own department or program within the SCDE. It would be inappropriate, however, to simply assume that SCDE faculty and administrators choose to operate in the same manner as their arts and sciences colleagues. Unlike arts and sciences departments, SCDEs must "combine practical and academic missions. . . .[and] face, Janus-like, in two opposite directions" (Clark, 1987, p. 94).

SCDEs in public research universities, in particular, face a prickly dilemma. As Lanier and Little (1986, p. 530) explain:

> It is common knowledge that professors in the arts and sciences risk a loss of academic respect, including promotion and tenure, if they assume clear interest in or responsibility for teacher education. Professors holding academic rank in education units are in even greater jeopardy of losing the respect of their academic counterparts in the university because their close proximity makes association with teacher education more possible.

Yet, professional schools in public research universities are in large measure dependent upon public support for their existence and would therefore seem obligated to allocate resources in ways that are consistent with the public's goals for the institution. The public, however, is likely to emphasize the practical aspects of the SCDE's mission (e.g., teacher education) at the expense of its academic goals.

This is the predicament faced by SCDE faculty members within research universities. Programs such as teacher training can be very time intensive, but as Gifford (1984) points out, they yield little in the way of prestige. How do SCDE faculties and deans balance these competing demands? Do they, as Goodlad (1990) suggests should be the case, allocate resources in alignment with the public's goals for the institution? Or, as James (1990) states, do they carry out profitable activities that society is willing to pay for (e.g., teacher education) in order to obtain resources for costly faculty-preferred activities that society will not fully finance directly (e.g., small graduate seminars)? In other

words, does the SCDE operate teacher education so as to subsidize other SCDE activities?

Method

The following outlines an approach suggested by James (1990) for assessing the extent to which a public research university operates its teacher education program in order to subsidize other SCDE activities. A previous section posited that an objective function for a research university department would take the form:

Departmental satisfaction = f_1(Departmental prestige, Faculty satisfaction)

= f_2(Research productivity, Student quality, Class size)

Subject to the constraint that: Revenues are equal to expenditures.

The focus of this paper is intradepartmental resource allocation and *within* an SCDE the constraint that revenues must equal expenditures need not apply to each program. Resources generated by 'profit-making' SCDE programs can be allocated to subsidize 'money-losing' SCDE programs. Obviously, however, the number and size of the profit-makers limit the number and size of the money-losers. This possibility of cross-subsidization suggests

the following SCDE objective function:

$$\text{SCDE satisfaction} = f_1(\text{SCDE prestige, Faculty satisfaction})$$

$$= f_2[QUALT(T), QUALN(N), R(F(T, N), TL, RGR), ACS_T(F(T, N)), ACS_N(F(T, N))]$$

subject to the break-even constraint that:

$$P_T * T + P_N * N + D(A) - A + RGR = (S + K)F$$

where:

T = number of students in teacher education program

N = number of students in other SCDE programs

QUALT = quality of students in teacher education program, a function of T

QUALN = quality of students in other SCDE programs, a function of N

R(F, TL, RGR) = research, a function of F, TL, and RGR

F = number of faculty, a function of T and N

TL = teaching load = $TL_T + TL_N$

RGR = research grants

ACS_T = average class size in teacher education program, a function of F

ACS_N = average class size in other SCDE programs, a function of F

P_T = additional revenue provided to SCDE for each T

P_N = additional revenue provided to SCDE for each N

D = donations, a function of A

A = administrative expenditures

S = average faculty salary

K = support services per faculty member

As with other university departments, SCDEs try to maximize an objective function that depends positively on research productivity and student quality, and negatively on class size, subject to a break-even constraint. In order to

account for possible cross-subsidization, the model has been specified in terms of teacher education and other SCDE programs.

Since the university's central administration determines P_T (additional revenue provided to SCDE for each student in the teacher education program) and P_N (additional revenue provided to SCDE for each student in other SCDE programs), the SCDE's task is to choose its optimal T (the number of students in the teacher education program) and N (the number of students in other SCDE programs). According to the model,[1] changes in teacher education enrollments affect SCDE satisfaction through its impact on selectivity in choosing teacher education students and on the number of SCDE faculty, the latter of which, in turn, influences the amount of time available for research and average class sizes. Changes in enrollments in other SCDE classes influence the selectivity in choosing students in other SCDE programs and the number of SCDE faculty.[2]

In order to reach equilibrium, SCDE administrators and faculty must trade off the negative effect increased enrollment incurs on student selectivity, with the positive influence of increased student numbers on faculty resources. Specifically, T (the number of students in the teacher education program) and N (the number of students in other SCDE programs) are inversely related to

---

[1] The first-order equilibrium conditions for changes in teacher education enrollments are:

$$\begin{aligned} df/dT &= (\partial f/\partial QUALT)(\partial QUALT/\partial T) \\ &+ (\partial f/\partial R)(\partial R/\partial F)(\partial F/\partial T)P_T/(S+K) \\ &+ (\partial f/\partial ACS_T)(\partial ACS_T/\partial F)(\partial F/\partial T)([F - P_T * T/(S+K)]/(ACS_T/T) * F^2 \\ &+ (\partial f/\partial ACS_N)(\partial ACS_N/\partial F)(\partial F/\partial T)(- P_T * N/(S+K)]/(ACS_N/N) * F^2 \\ &= 0 \end{aligned}$$

For a discussion of the theory underlying this approach see Silberberg (1990), p. 166-171.

[2] The first-order equilibrium conditions for changes in other SCDE enrollments are:

$$\begin{aligned} df/dN &= (\partial f/\partial QUALN)(\partial QUALN/\partial N) \\ &+ (\partial f/\partial R)(\partial R/\partial F)(\partial F/\partial N)P_N/(S+K) \\ &+ (\partial f/\partial ACS_T)(\partial ACS_T/\partial F)(\partial F/\partial N)([F - P_N * N/(S+K)]/(ACS_N/N) * F^2 \\ &+ (\partial f/\partial ACS_N)(\partial ACS_N/\partial F)(\partial F/\partial N)(- P_N * N/(S+K)]/(ACS_T/T) * F^2 \\ &= 0 \end{aligned}$$

QUALT (quality of students in the teacher education program) and QUALN (quality of students in other SCDE programs), respectively. This follows from James's observation that as a department dips deeper into a relatively fixed pool of applicants, student quality is likely to decline. However, T and N determine student credit hours, which positively affect F (the number of faculty), which in turn increases the amount of time available for R (research). This sets up a tension between the desire for larger SCDE enrollments--which lead to more student credit hours, more faculty, and more research--and the desire for lower enrollments in a faculty member's own program, so that the faculty member can yield satisfaction from lower class sizes and higher student quality.

According to the first-order equilibrium conditions (see Footnote 1), the SCDE will admit teacher education students as long as the satisfaction derived from the availability of increased revenues--which allows for cross-subsidization of research--outweighs the losses incurred in terms of lower quality teacher education students and larger class sizes. In a like manner (see Footnote 2), the SCDE will admit students to other SCDE programs as long as the satisfaction derived from the availability of increased revenues outweighs the loss incurred in terms of lower quality students in these other programs and larger class sizes. Since the influence of enrollments on average class sizes does not vary by program, the degree of cross-subsidization in each program will be a function of the value the SCDE places on selectivity in choosing the program's students.

This generates the following testable hypothesis:

> If an SCDE equally values student selectivity in its teacher education program and in other programs, then faculty resources per revenue unit allocated to

the SCDE by the university's budgeting process--
which is a function of student credit hours--should be
similar in both programs.

The degree to which faculty resource allocation differs from revenue generation in each program is a measure of the extent of cross-subsidization carried out by the SCDE.

Results

Following is a summary of the current SCDE faculty resource commitment in a large public research university. Data were collected for the 1989-90 and 1990-91 academic years as to who delivered the SCDE's curriculum, the conditions under which they did so (e.g., class size), the salaries they were paid,[3] the share of SCDE budget each program comprised, and the share of SCDE student credit hours generated. In order to minimize the variance among course work being compared, only that portion of the curriculum that the SCDE delivered through classroom courses is included.[4]

Goodlad (1990, p. 75) states that, in the modern research university, "The education of teachers commonly ranks low, and it is often shunted off to adjunct,

---

[3] Full-time employment for tenure-line faculty is defined in this study as 12 credit hours per quarter or 36 credit hours per year. Tenure-line salary costs for a course were therefore calculated by the following formula:

Tenure-line salary cost equals

(course quarter hours/36)

multiplied by

(tenure-line faculty member's academic year salary)

Adjunct faculty salaries were paid on a per course basis.

[4] Classroom courses are defined in this study to include all courses offered by the SCDE with the exception of: (a) workshops, (b) field studies, (c) practicums, (d) independent studies, (e) master's theses, and (f) doctoral dissertations.

part-time, temporary, nontenured instructors." As shown in Table 1, teacher education students[5] were twice as likely to be in a class taught by an untenured assistant professor than were their counterparts in non-teacher education courses and one-third more likely to be in a class taught by an adjunct instructor. At the other extreme, teacher education students were 40% less likely to be in a class taught by a full professor than were students in other SCDE courses.

Table 1

Distribution of Teaching Load in Non-Teacher Education and Teacher Education Classroom Courses by Rank: 1989-90 and 1990-91 Academic Years

	Percentage of program total taught		Percentage
Rank	Other SCDE programs	Teacher education	difference
Full professor	39.1	23.2	-40.7
Associate professor	25.2	19.8	-21.4
Assistant professor	9.5	21.5	126.3
Adjuncts	26.2	35.5	35.5

Another major difference between the experiences of students in teacher education and non-teacher-education courses was the average class size. Students in teacher education courses had nearly 30 students in their average class, more than double the size of the average non-teacher-education class (see Table 2).

[5] The preservice teacher education program is defined in this study as that coursework that is designed specifically for preservice teachers and that does not enroll substantial numbers of nonpreservice teachers.

Table 2

Average Class Size in Non-Teacher Education and Teacher Education Classroom Courses: 1989-90 and 1990-91 Academic Years

Program	Average class size	Percentage difference
Other SCDE programs	12.7	--
Teacher education	29.1	129.1

These resource allocation decisions are driven in large part by university budgeting procedures. Since the teacher education program is delivered through undergraduate-level courses, with other SCDE course work at graduate-level only, student credit hours generated in the teacher education are not weighted as heavily in the university budgeting process as are student credit hours generated by other SCDE courses. Therefore, even though the teacher education program generated 37.6% of the SCDE's total student credit hours, it only accounted for 20.4% of the revenue units allocated to the SCDE by the university's budgeting process (see Table 3).

Table 3

Comparison Between Student Credit Hours and Tenure-Line Faculty Units Generated by Teacher Education Classroom Courses: 1989-90 and 1990-91 Academic Years

Program	Student credit hours	Percentage of SCH	Percentage of revenue units generated[a]
Other SCDE programs	17,392	62.4	79.6
Teacher education	10,475	37.6	20.4

[a] Student credit hours in each program weighted by the university course-level weighting factor.

As Table 4 shows, when the differing weight placed on undergraduate and graduate credits are taken into account, the degree to which resources generated by teacher education are used to subsidize other SCDE programs is about 10%.

Table 4

Non-Teacher Education and Teacher Education Classroom Course Instructional Salaries per Revenue Unit Allocated to the SCDE by the University's Budgeting Process: 1989-90 and 1990-91 Academic Years

Program	Instructional salary per revenue unit generated[a]	Percentage Difference
Other SCDE programs	$17,653.94	--
Teacher education	16,129.88	-8.6

[a] Student credit hours in each program weighted by the university course-level weighting factor.

Discussion

Any consideration of allocating resources for teacher education reform must include two distinct sets of perspectives--those from within the SCDE and those from outside the unit. Within the SCDE, resource allocation decisions are made as to what share of the unit's budget will be devoted to preservice teacher education. During the next decade, these decisions are likely to have increasing influence upon how the SCDE's budget requests are viewed outside the unit (i.e., at the university and state level). While the political dynamic internal to SCDEs has not generally been favorable to teacher education reform, conditions developing in the outside context will provide significant pressure to increase such support.

From the internal perspective of the student or the institution, the resource allocation scheme used in this SCDE is justifiable. The university

charges students in the non-teacher education program significantly higher tuition than preservice teachers. For these higher fees, they receive much smaller class sizes and the bulk of tenured faculty resources, especially at the full-professor level. The teacher education program generates 20.4% of the SCDE's resources through the university budgeting process and the SCDE allocates nearly 19% of its instructional salary resources to this group.

From the perspective of society at large, however, these trade offs may not be as acceptable. Outsiders may be less concerned with a balance between personal or institutional costs and benefits than they are with the congruence between the goals society holds for the institution and how the resources are eventually allocated. If the primary goal society holds for an SCDE is the production of well-prepared teachers, then it is likely to see class sizes averaging 29 in the teacher education program--while other courses average less than 13--as being inappropriate. Similarly, if society sees the preparation of educators for elementary and secondary schools as central to the purpose for which the institution exists, then it will almost certainly call into question the routine allocation of the least-senior faculty members to this enterprise.

In a profit-maximizing enterprise, society's preference for teacher education over graduate education would eventually cause the firm to lower its investment in graduate education and shift these resources instead into lower class sizes and more-senior faculty for teacher education. SCDEs, however, are not profit-maximizing enterprises. Without outside intervention, deans and faculties may choose to subsidize activities (e.g., small graduate seminars) that maximize internal satisfaction, rather than focusing resources on activities which society deems to be most worthwhile.

Implications

Once an institution sets its priorities, the development of a budget acts as a systematic process for translating these goals into specific programs. This point will test the depth of support for proposals to reform teacher education. Unless the SCDE can generate substantial new resources to support these priorities, some other current SCDE programs will have to be either scaled back or made to run more cost effectively in order to recover needed funding. The zero-sum nature of budgeting in most circumstances may partly explain the reluctance of reform advocates to directly address the financing of their proposals. Discussions of who gets what are potentially divisive, and intensely political, since they decide not only what the SCDE will buy, but, what is more important, "what priorities prevail and whose purposes receive the greatest allocations of [available] resources" (Hartman, 1988, p. 2).

The challenge faced by those who seek to renew teacher education is, therefore, largely a political one. Redistributing scarce human and financial resources within the SCDE in order to fund teacher education reform will almost certainly create a number of perceived "winners" and "losers" relative to past practice. It is unfortunate for reform advocates that the SCDE must pursue this redistribution through an inherently political budgeting process, and recent trends in teacher education have markedly increased the political power of potential losers.

> A new kind of school of education has emerged, staffed in large part by professors whose interests and backgrounds are far afield from teacher education and (quite frequently) even schools. Yet they make up the voting faculty in the vital business of setting priorities and firming them up with those who are recruited to carry them out. (Goodlad, 1990, p. 78)

The question which reform advocates must answer is: How do you convince a sufficient number of voting faculty members to act against their perceived self-interests, and to reallocate the resources toward the new set of goals implicit in substantive teacher education reform?

One approach, outlined by Goodlad (1990), depends upon both a carrot and a club. The carrot he extends to SCDEs follows this logic. For the foreseeable future, state and federal budgets are likely to be under a great deal of pressure that will intensify the need for colleges and universities to provide tangible justification for expenditure requests. In such an environment, public colleges and universities will be quick to focus public relations attention on those programs that society perceives as responding to local needs. For example, universities have routinely tied appeals for increased state aid to the positive impact which agricultural or technological advances emanating from the university have on the local economy.

It would therefore be in the self-interest of SCDEs to discard their "prestige obsession" and return instead to their professional school roots. The predominantly local composition of the student body and the likelihood that the majority of these students will accept positions teaching the children of voters within the state both support the local appeal of teacher education programs. At a time in which many political leaders are linking economic competitiveness to school improvement, budgetary requests that tie an increased supply of well-trained teachers to school reform should not be difficult to justify. As a bonus, these efforts should also benefit non-teacher education faculty.

> Making dominant and visible the better selection and education of schoolteachers--a function of great public importance that is easy for legislators to understand and support--may be precisely what is required to gain related support for those many other enterprises much valued by

> universities but little understood by the general public. (Goodlad, 1990, p. 113-4)

If SCDEs are proactive and move quickly and publicly to renew their teacher education programs, reform can be a "win-win situation" for all parties involved.

The club that seems implicit is a growing perception that teacher education renewal may be not only the SCDEs *best* hope, it may be their *only* hope for survival in their present form. The 1990s are likely to be a decade of rough sledding for higher education as it comes under much the same scrutiny endured by elementary and secondary education in the 1980s. Such public attention is very likely to call into question SCDE attempts to pursue internally generated goals at the expense of activities (e.g., teacher education) that society perceives to have greater value.

While non-teacher-education faculty members in SCDEs may be able to make a convincing case to each other for what they do, data from interviews with presidents, provosts, and arts and sciences faculty members reported by Goodlad suggest that this viewpoint may not be universally shared elsewhere on campus. This may become increasingly clear as competition for limited dollars intensifies and demands increase for greater accountability as to how colleges and universities spend the public and private money they receive. In such an environment, funding for an SCDE in which teacher preparation is a peripheral activity may become an increasingly difficult sell in the president's office, as well as in many state legislatures.

This will leave SCDEs to face two alternatives. The first is that "teacher education could be lopped off as part of the selective pruning effected as these institutions seek to become leaner and better" (Goodlad, 1990, p. 114). The prognosis for that which will then remain in an SCDE is not promising. The second is for education faculties and deans to act on behalf of what will be

perceived to be in the public interest, and to reallocate resources in ways that will more closely align with the public's goals for the institution. Comprehensive reform that brings higher education into closer contact with the public schools and involves it more seriously in teacher education is a promising avenue for saving SCDEs from an otherwise forbidding future.

Conclusion

The current level of state and national interest in teacher education is likely to create a very hostile environment for colleges and universities attempting to maintain the status quo. In such an environment, SCDEs essentially have two choices: rebuild and enhance their teacher education programs or close them down.

Either of these two responses will almost certainly require major budgetary revisions. A reliable indicator that an institution is taking its task seriously and has moved teacher education to the forefront of the institution's mission--or is at least advancing it through the ranks--is a concurrent increase in resource availability for the program. In the absence of massive infusions of additional resources, which are unlikely to be forthcoming, such increases for teacher education will make necessary reallocations from other valued enterprises. Concerns as to whose ox might be gored in this process currently serve as a powerful, though often unspoken, constraint on efforts to renew teacher education.

The cost of getting out of teacher education, however, may be even higher, especially for public colleges and universities. The preparation of teachers--the purpose for which most SCDEs were created--remains a powerful source of legitimacy with much of the general public, not to mention with many legislators. SCDEs attempting to remove themselves from the teacher

education fray, in favor of activities little understood or appreciated by the general public, run grave risks of being perceived as uncaring, uninvolved, and even irrelevant.

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